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The Challenges of the New
Defalcation Standard
by
Jonathon S. Byington*
The crux of bankruptcy law is giving debtors a fresh start by discharging
their debts.  Yet society has recognized that some debts should not be discharged
because they either have a high level of societal importance or derive from a
debtor’s culpable conduct.  One of these exceptions from discharge is for defalca-
tion while acting in a fiduciary capacity.  The legal meaning of defalcation has
been unclear for 172 years, ranging from a breach of trust by one who has charge
of money to the misappropriation of money in one’s keeping.  A three-way fed-
eral circuit split developed on whether a state of mind was required for defalca-
tion and if so, how culpable.  In May 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved
the circuit split in Bullock v. BankChampaign by establishing a new, heightened
mental standard based on the Model Penal Code’s definition of “recklessly.”
Bullock’s holding is significant because it did not adopt any of the tests from the
circuit split.  Bullock’s new test is challenging for three reasons.  First, applying
a Model Penal Code culpability to civil fiduciary law is awkward because the
various sources of fiduciary duties rarely contain a mental state requirement.
Second, the Model Penal Code’s recklessly definition is abstract and difficult to
apply.  For example, instead of focusing on the breach of a fiduciary duty, it
concentrates on the risk that a fiduciary duty will be breached.  Further, some
elements of recklessly must be evaluated from a subjective standard while others
require an objective one. Finally, in delineating the new recklessly test, Bullock
parenthetically grafted in the separate criminal law doctrine of willful blindness.
This synthesis of recklessness and willful blindness, which are two completely
different tests, results in a seemingly unworkable standard that does not make
sense.  This Article explores each element of the new recklessly standard and
identifies pitfalls to avoid.  It also suggests an approach to reconcile the troub-
ling analytical problems resulting from combining recklessness and willful blind-
ness.  This Article concludes by establishing an analytical framework to apply
Bullock’s new test.
*Assistant Professor, University of Montana School of Law.  I am grateful for the insightful comments
and suggestions from Professor Michelle Bryan Mudd and Professor Larry Howell.  I also thank Benjamin
L. Keller and Rachel Wanderscheid for their research.
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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the primary purposes of bankruptcy law is to provide debtors a
fresh start.1  This is done through the discharge2 of debts and ensuing injunc-
tion3 barring creditor efforts to collect discharged debts.  The fresh start pol-
icy, however, has limits.4  Not all debts and debtors are equal.
Society has demanded a fresh start be withheld for certain types of debts,
such as those relating to taxes,5 domestic-support obligations,6 government
fines,7 educational loans,8 and orders of restitution in criminal cases.9  The
very nature of these debts is significant enough to outweigh10 both the pub-
lic11 and private interest in providing debtors a fresh start.
In addition to withholding a discharge based on the nature or type of
debt, there is no discharge of debt arising from certain types of reprehensible
conduct by a debtor.  For example, there is no discharge for debts obtained
by false pretenses or actual fraud,12 embezzlement,13 larceny,14 willful and
malicious injury by the debtor to another,15 or death or injury caused by the
1Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007) (noting that “[t]he principal purpose of
the Bankruptcy Code is to grant a fresh start to the honest but unfortunate debtor”); Local Loan Co. v.
Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (stating the fresh start policy is a “public as well as private interest, in
that it gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor who surrenders for distribution the property which he
owns at the time of bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by
the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt”).
2Even though it is not a fundamental right, see Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991) (noting
that “a debtor has no constitutional or ‘fundamental’ right to a discharge in bankruptcy”) (citing United
States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 445-46 (1973)), § 524(a) prevents waiver of a discharge and § 524(c) con-
tains significant restrictions and requirements for post-petition reaffirmation of debt.
311 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2).
4See generally 11 U.S.C. § 523(a); Cohen v. de La Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 222 (1998) (stating that “[t]he
various exceptions to discharge in § 523(a) reflect a conclusion on the part of Congress that the creditors’
interest in recovering full payment of debts in these categories outweigh[s] the debtors’ interest in a
complete fresh start”); Bruning v. United States, 376 U.S. 358, 361 (1964) (noting that the predecessor to
§ 523(a) “[was] not a compassionate section for debtors” because “it demonstrate[d] congressional judg-
ment that certain problems . . . override the value of giving the debtor a wholly fresh start”).
511 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1).
611 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5).
711 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7).
811 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).
911 U.S.C. § 523(a)(13).
10Grogan, 498 U.S. at 287 (stating that “Congress evidently concluded that the creditors’ interest in
recovering full payment of debts in these categories outweighed the debtors’ interest in a complete fresh
start”).
11John M. Czarnetzy, The Individual and Failure: A Theory of The Bankruptcy Discharge, 32 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 393, 405 (2000) (discussing an entrepreneurial theory behind the bankruptcy discharge); Adam
Feibelman, Defining The Social Insurance Function of Consumer Bankruptcy, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 129 (2005) (discussing the function of bankruptcy as social insurance).
1211 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2).
1311 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4).
1411 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4).
1511 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).
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debtor’s operation of a vehicle while the debtor was intoxicated.16
This Article focuses on the bankruptcy discharge exception for “defalca-
tion while acting in a fiduciary capacity.”17  Since the adoption of the 1841
Bankruptcy Act18 some 172 years ago, the meaning of “defalcation” has been
unclear19 and changing.20  There has been a “longstanding disagreement”21
among courts22 as well as scholars23 on what is required.  Even though excep-
tions to discharge “should be confined to those plainly expressed,”24 a broad
spectrum of different meanings has been attributed to the term by the federal
circuit courts.  The difficulty has come in part because it is hard to delineate
1611 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9).
1711 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4).
18Defalcation in connection with nondischargeable debt first appeared in the 1841 Bankruptcy Act.
Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440, 441 (1841).
19Judge Learned Hand described court decisions addressing the meaning of defalcation as “not indeed
very satisfactory.”  Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Herbst, 93 F.2d 510, 512 (2nd Cir. 1937); Report
of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. II, ‘ 4- 506,
note 11 (noting the term defalcation was uncertain in meaning); Quaif v. Johnson, 4 F.3d 950, 955 (11th
Cir. 1993) (noting “the precise meaning of ‘defalcation’ for purposes of § 523(a)(4) has never been entirely
clear.”)
20Zvi S. Rosen, Discharging Fiduciary Debts, 87 AM. BANKR. L.J. 51 (Winter 2013) (examining the
evolution and historical meaning of the term “defalcation”).
21Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., __ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1754, 1759 (2013).
22Antlers Roof-Truss& Builders Supply v. Storie (In re Storie), 216 B.R. 283, 288 (10th Cir. B.A.P.
1997) (focusing on the debtor’s failure to account for entrusted funds “due to any breach of a fiduciary
duty, whether intentional, willful, reckless, or negligent”); Republic of Rwanda v. Uwimana (In re
Uwimana), 274 F.3d 806, 811 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating “negligence or even an innocent mistake which
results in misappropriation or failure to account is sufficient”); Blyler v. Hemmeter (In re Hemmeter), 242
F.3d 1186, 1190 (9th Cir. 2001); Follett Higher Educ. Group, Inc. v. Berman (In re Berman), 629 F.3d 761,
766 n.3 (7th Cir. 2011) (stating “[d]efalcation requires something more than negligence or mistake, but less
than fraud”); FNFS, Ltd. v. Harwood (In re Harwood), 637 F.3d 615, 624 (5th Cir. 2011) (requiring a
willful neglect of duty “measured objectively by reference to what a reasonable person in the debtor’s
position knew or reasonably should have known”); Rutanen v. Baylis (In re Baylis), 313 F.3d 9, 20 (1st Cir.
2002) (stating “defalcation requires something close to a showing of extreme recklessness”).
23Andrea Johnson, The Defalcation Exception to Discharge: Should a Fiduciary’s Mistake Prohibit a
Discharge from Debt?, 27 W. NEW ENG. L. REV., 93, 131 (2005) (recommending a “willful neglect” stan-
dard of intent); Rosen, supra note 20, at 87 (asserting there is no need to impose any type of mental state
requirement); Matthew W. Knox, Persistent Confusion: The Circuit Split over the Exception to Discharge
for Defalcation Under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4), 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1078, 1110 (2008) (claiming a
“willful neglect or recklessness” standard would be best); Alyssa Miller, “Some Portion of Misconduct”:
The Argument for a Negligence Standard for Excepting Discharge of Debts Incurred Through Defalcation, 2
WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 185, 204 (2011) (arguing a “negligence” standard should be applied); Bradley
M. Elbein, An Obscure Revolution: The Liability of Professionals in Bankruptcy, 48 S.C. L. REV. 743, 769
(1997) (focusing on professional fiduciaries and stating “it makes sense to avoid the metaphysical debates
over defalcation and fiduciary and instead to ask a relatively simple question: Did the debtor use his
superior knowledge and power to take advantage of the creditor?”).
24Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558, 562 (1915). Bullock avoided stating that exceptions to discharge
should be strictly or narrowly construed.  The attorney representing Bullock on appeal before the Court
suggested that “[e]schewing the phrase ‘strict construction’ may have avoided friction with some members
of the Court who might object to that freighted language.”  Thomas M. Byrne, Defalcation Defined; Bul-
lock v. BankChampaign, 30 BANKR. STRATEGIST 9 (July 1, 2013).
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how culpable a debtor’s conduct must be in order to preclude the fresh start
by not discharging a debt.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent Bullock v.
BankChampaign decision25 (“Bullock”) resolved the circuit split by holding
that defalcation includes a culpable state of mind requirement involving
“knowledge of, or gross recklessness in respect to, the improper nature of the
relevant fiduciary behavior.”26 Bullock adopted the Model Penal Code’s defi-
nition of “recklessly” as the new, uniform standard to be applied in all federal
circuits.27
This Article does not question whether Bullock chose “the correct” state
of mind for the defalcation exception to discharge.  Instead, it focuses on the
many implications and challenges from Bullock that will need to be addressed
by courts in the future.  Part II of this Article explains the pre-Bullock circuit
split on the different mental states required for defalcation, identifies the
broadening scope of fiduciary capacity, and summarizes the Bullock back-
ground and decision.  Part III explores the challenges arising from the Bullock
decision.  First, it explains why applying the Model Penal Code definition of
recklessly to civil fiduciary law is awkward and disjointed.
Second, it highlights why the Model Penal Code’s definition of recklessly
is abstract and difficult to apply.  It examines the crucial distinction between
objective and subjective standards and clarifies which standard applies to the
respective elements of the new recklessly test.  It also provides distinctions
and contours that have been drawn by courts in criminal cases and criminal
law scholars for each element of recklessly.  Third, it explores the seemingly
unworkable criteria created by Bullock’s modification of the definition of
recklessly to also include the separate criminal law doctrine of willful blind-
ness. Bullock’s implications on summary judgment proceedings and pleading
requirements are also discussed.  After describing these challenges, this Arti-
cle suggests an approach to reconcile the problem arising from Bullock’s modi-
fication of recklessly and establishes an overall analytical framework to apply
Bullock’s new test.
II. BACKGROUND
A. PRE-BULLOCK CIRCUIT SPLIT: THE SPECTRUM OF STANDARDS
CONSTITUTING DEFALCATION
Before Bullock, the federal circuits spanned the spectrum on whether de-
falcation required a state of mind and if so, what level of culpability was
required.
25Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754 (2013).
26Id. at 1757.
27Id. at 1759.
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1. Fiduciary Status Regardless of State of Mind
One end of the range did not even require a specific state of mind, instead
looking at the nature of the debt arising from the debtor’s status as a fiduci-
ary and at the breach of the fiduciary duty.  The Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel focused on the debtor’s failure to account for entrusted funds
“due to any breach of a fiduciary duty, whether intentional, willful, reckless,
or negligent.”28  No mental state was required for this approach29 because it
assumed the “requisite badness” was achieved by the breach of an elevated
standard of care/loyalty applicable to fiduciaries.30  The focus was on the
fiduciary’s special legal status with respect to the creditor, and the public
policy of protecting the integrity of fiduciary relationships.  Under this view,
the term “defalcation” simply described the breach of a certain type of fiduci-
ary duty (i.e. the failure to account for entrusted funds) by the debtor-fiduci-
ary.31  The Fourth Circuit included innocent mistakes and negligence.32  The
Ninth Circuit found defalcation for “innocent acts of failure to fully account
for money received in trust”33 and the Eighth Circuit included “the innocent
default of a fiduciary who fails to account fully for money received.”34
Under this view, a fiduciary debtor’s culpability need not exist (or need
only be slight) in order to remove the fresh start and not discharge a debt
because it would encompass inadvertent and ordinary mistakes of judgment.
In a fiduciary debtor context, this view cuts away huge swathes from the
fresh start policy because any breach of fiduciary duty in connection with a
failure to account for entrusted funds results in nondischargeable debt.  This
view is unique in that it focuses more on the nature35 of the debt arising in a
fiduciary context than it does on the bad conduct36 of the fiduciary debtor.
In contrast, the views of the other circuits focus more on the conduct of the
debtor.
2. Objective Recklessness
Moving beyond the nature of the debt analysis, other circuits required
28In re Storie, 216 B.R. at 288.
29Id. (stating “[t]here is no mental state required in section 523(a)(4) for a ‘defalcation’”).
30Id.
31Id. at 287.
32In re Uwimana, 274 F.3d at 811 (stating “negligence or even an innocent mistake which results in
misappropriation or failure to account is sufficient”).
33In re Hemmeter, 242 F.3d at 1190.
34Tudor Oaks Ltd. P’ship v. Cochrane (In re Cochrane), 124 F.3d 978, 984 (8th Cir. 1997).
35For nondischargeability purposes, this view appears to place debt connected with the breach of a
fiduciary debtor in the same category as taxes, educational loans, or domestic support payments—debts
that are important to society for policy reasons.
36However, in an unpublished opinion, the Tenth Circuit commented that at least “some portion of
misconduct” was required. See Okla. Grocers Assoc., Inc. v. Millikan (In re Millikan), 188 Fed. App’x 699,
702 (10th Cir. 2006) (stating defalcation “requires, at least, ‘some portion of misconduct’ ” but declining to
reconcile the varying opinions of other circuit courts).
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the debtor to have “some degree of fault.”37  The Seventh Circuit said
“[d]efalcation requires something more than negligence or mistake, but less
than fraud.”38  The Fifth Circuit said “a willful neglect of duty” would suf-
fice, which it defined as not requiring actual intent but rather as “measured
objectively by reference to what a reasonable person in the debtor’s position
knew or reasonably should have known.”39  The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits
agreed and required the fiduciary debtor to have been “objectively
reckless.”40
3. Extreme Recklessness or Scienter
The highest state of mind requirement on the spectrum was extreme
recklessness or scienter.41  The First Circuit explained:
To show defalcation, a creditor need not prove that a debtor
acted knowingly or willfully, in the sense of specific intent.
However, a creditor must be able to show that a debtor’s
actions were so egregious that they come close to the level
that would be required to prove fraud, embezzlement, or
larceny.
A debtor fiduciary may not escape the exclusion from
discharge of his debt arising out of defalcation by saying he
had no specific intent.  As in other areas of the law, circum-
stances will provide the level of wrongdoing needed to con-
stitute a defalcation.  One useful analogy is to the law of
securities, which requires “scienter.”  Scienter, in the context
of securities fraud, is a mental state embracing intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud.  A form of recklessness can
meet the requirement of scienter, but it is more like a lesser
form of intent.  This form of recklessness is an extreme de-
parture from the standards of ordinary care.  The mental
state required for defalcation is akin to the level of reckless-
ness required for scienter.  It is more than the mere conscious
taking of risk associated with the usual torts standard of
recklessness.  Instead, defalcation requires something close to
a showing of extreme recklessness.42
37Follett Higher Educ. Group, Inc., 629 F.3d at 766 n.3.
38Id.
39In re Harwood, 637 F.3d at 624.
40Patel v. Shamrock Floorcovering Serv., Inc. (In re Patel), 565 F.3d 963, 970-71 (6th Cir. 2009);
Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A. (In re Bullock), 670 F.3d 1160, 1165 (11th Cir. 2012) (stating it was
aligning itself with the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits).
41In re Baylis, 313 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2002).
42Id. at 20.
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The Second Circuit agreed and required “a showing of conscious misbe-
havior or extreme recklessness—a showing akin to the showing required for
scienter in the securities law context.”43  This higher standard prevented a
finding of defalcation for every debt incurred in connection with the mere
breach of a fiduciary duty and also furthered to a greater extent the fresh
start policy of bankruptcy law.44
B. THE BROADENING SCOPE OF A “FIDUCIARY CAPACITY” IN
SECTION 523(A)(4)
Section 523(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code requires “defalcation while act-
ing in a fiduciary capacity.”45  The meaning of defalcation is even more impor-
tant given the judicial broadening of the term “fiduciary capacity” in
§ 523(a)(4).  The law on what constitutes a fiduciary capacity is murky46 and
there is an unsettled debate.47  Over time, courts have been trending away
from a very narrow interpretation of fiduciary capacity to a broad one.
43Denton v. Hyman (In re Hyman), 502 F.3d 61, 68 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating “we now align ourselves
with the First Circuit”).
44In re Baylis, 313 F.3d at 19 (stating “[o]ur view is based on both the structure of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)
and the ‘fresh start’ policy” and is “consistent with the ‘fresh start’ policy undergirding the bankruptcy
system”).
4511 U.C.S. § 523(a)(4).
46Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Who Is Acting in “Fiduciary Capacity” Within Meaning of Fraud or
Defalcation Discharge Exception in Bankruptcy (11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(4))—Fiduciary Capacity of Debtors
Other Than Sales, Purchasing, or Leasing Agent Debtors, 17 A.L.R. FED. 2d 33 (2007); Ann K. Wooster,
Annotation, Who Is Acting in “Fiduciary Capacity” Within Meaning of Fraud or Defalcation Discharge
Exception in Bankruptcy (11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(4))—Fiduciary Capacity of Debtors Involved in Sale,
Purchase, or Lease of Goods or Services Other Than Legal, Financial, Investment, or Banking Products or
Services, 15 A.L.R. FED. 2d 337 (2006).
47Rosen, supra note 20, at 66 (arguing that “[b]y opening the gate to state law concepts of a general
fiduciary duty, rather than limiting it to duties arising from an express or technical trust, this exception
threatened to swallow the general discharge”); Jennifer Liotta, ERISA Fiduciaries in Bankruptcy: Preserv-
ing Individual Liability for Defalcation and Fraud Debts Under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4), 22 EMORY BANKR.
DEV. J. 725, 758 (2006) (arguing an ERISA fiduciary should be a fiduciary capacity for purposes of Section
523(a)(4)); Bradley Kendall Mahanay, An Analysis of the Matter of Bennett and Its Effect on Non-Dis-
chargeability of Debt for Defalcation While Acting In a Fiduciary Capacity, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 281, 292
(1994) (arguing a general partner should not be in a fiduciary capacity to limited partners for purposes of
Section 523(a)(4)); Elbein, supra note 23, at 743 (claiming “[r]ecent cases have overturned a century and a
half of interpretation. . .”); Michael D. Sousa, Are You Your Produce Vendor’s Keeper?  The Perishable
Agricultural Commodities Act and § 523(a)(4) of the Code, 15 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 6 ART. 3 (Dec. 2006)
(stating “an expansion of the meaning of ‘fiduciary capacity’ to encompass trusts created by statute offends
the admonitions of the United States Supreme Court to strictly limit this provision of the Bankruptcy
Code”); Michael D. Sousa, The Nondischargeability of Partners’ Debts Under § 523(a)(4): The Unresolved
Collision Between the Bankruptcy Code and Partnership Law, 14 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 3 ART. 2 (2005)
(asserting the “proper approach is to follow those courts which conclude that co-partners do not act in a
fiduciary capacity for purposes of determining the dischargeability of debts in bankruptcy”); Peter M.
Reinhardt and William G. Horlbeck, Defalcation While Acting In a Fiduciary Capacity: What Does It
Mean?, 79 COLO. LAW. 1773 (Aug. 1995) (claiming “[t]he meaning of fiduciary capacity under Code
§ 523(a)(4) is a matter of federal law and is narrower than the traditional, common-law meaning of the
term ‘fiduciary’”).
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For example, in 1844 the Supreme Court48 interpreted “fiduciary capac-
ity” in the 1841 Bankruptcy Act as being limited to “technical trusts, and not
those which the law implies from the contract.”49  In 1934, the Court kept
the same meaning by construing “fiduciary capacity” under the 1898 Bank-
ruptcy Act in a “strict and narrow sense.”50  This initial narrow view limit-
ing a fiduciary capacity to express and technical trusts is still followed by
some courts,51 but others have greatly expanded the scope.  Some have found
that the technical or express trust requirement is not limited to trusts that
arise by virtue of a formal trust agreement, but includes “relationships in
which trust-type obligations are imposed pursuant to statute or common
law.”52  Others have begun to focus on “characteristically fiduciary duties
over and above the obligations inherent in an ordinary, arm’s length commer-
cial relationship, whether such duties are created by contract, common law or
statute.”53
Even though the determination of whether someone is acting in a fiduci-
ary capacity is an issue of federal law,54 courts have begun to “regularly”55
look to state law to determine whether a fiduciary capacity exists and have
found56 a fiduciary capacity in a wide variety of circumstances.  For example,
debtors have been found to be acting in a fiduciary capacity as the attorney
or escrow holder in connection with an attorney-client relationship,57 as a
48Chapman v. Forsyth, 43 U.S. 202 (1844).
49Id. at 208; see also Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328, 333 (1934) (reaffirming a limited
judicial construction by interpreting “fiduciary capacity” in Section 17(4) of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act in
the same manner).
50Davis, 293 U.S. at 333 (quoting Chapman and stating the scope of the exception was to be limited
accordingly).
51Rhode Island Lottery Comm’n v. Cairone (In re Cairone), 12 B.R. 60, 62 (Bankr. D. R.I. 1981)
(noting that “[t]he traditional definition of a ‘fiduciary’ is not applicable in bankruptcy law” and that the
“general meaning—a relationship involving confidence, trust and good faith—is far too broad”); BAMCO
18 v. Reeves (In re Reeves), 124 B.R. 5, 10 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1990) (stating “I realize that many lower court
decisions following the Davis decision have in effect ignored the Supreme Court’s teaching regarding
technical and express trusts”); Spinosa v. Heilman (In re Heilman), 241 B.R. 137, 160 (Bankr. D. Md. 1999)
(stating “[m]any opinions, in effect, have permitted State courts and legislatures to overrule Chapman v.
Forsyth and restrict the class of debtors to whom a bankruptcy discharge is available by deferring to the
State law of fiduciaries”).
52LSP Investment P’ship v. Bennett (In re Bennett), 989 F.2d 779, 784-85 (5th Cir. 1993); Abrams v.
Sea Palms Associates, Ltd., 229 B.R. 784, 792 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1999).
53Zohlman v. Zoldan (In re Zoldan), 221 B.R. 79, 87 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998); Corestates Asset Mgmt
v. Kohler (In re Kohler), 255 B.R. 666, 668 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2000).
54In re Cochrane, 124 F.3d at 984.
55Buchholz v. Cook (In re Cook), 263 B.R. 249, 255 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2001).
56One court perceptively observed that “in the cases of express or technical trusts, fiduciary duties are
accepted by the fiduciary in the factual sense, and not imposed in the legal sense . . . .  The true distinction
of Chapman is that an express or technical trust, or its equivalent, is required, which can never be created
by statute along absent the parties’ own intent.” In re Heilman, 241 B.R. at 166.
57FDIC v. Mmahat, 907 F.2d 546, 550 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 936 (1991); Shea v.
Goldstein (In re Goldstein), 234 B.R. 214, 221 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1999); Rodrigue v. Humphrey (In re
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partner in a partnership,58 as directors or officers of insolvent corporations,59
as managers of limited liability companies,60 as joint venturers in a farming
operation,61 as trustees under the Perishable Agricultural Commodities
Act,62 as fiduciaries under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA),63 and as insurance agents collecting insurance policy
premiums.64
These various fiduciary capacities arise from many different sources.  A
fiduciary relationship may be created by a state statute,65 a combination of
state statute and common law,66 a city ordinance,67 a federal statute,68 or by
private, voluntary agreements such as indemnity agreements,69 dealer sales
agreements,70 or instruments creating an express trust.71  Thus, there are
many different types and sources of fiduciary duties.  With the scope of what
Humphrey), 350 B.R. 657, 660 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2006); Bookbinder v. Pleeter (In re Pleeter), 293 B.R. 812,
816 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2003); Andy Warhol Found. for Visual Arts, Inc. v. Hayes (In re Hayes), 183 F.3d
162, 173 (2d Cir. 1999).
58Ragsdale v. Haller (In re Ragsdale), 780 F.2d 794, 796-97 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding California had
made all partners trustees over the assets of the partnership and that California partners are fiduciaries
within the meaning of § 523(a)(4)); In re Bennett, 989 F.2d at 781 (stating “Texas law clearly and ex-
pressly imposes trust obligations on managing partners of limited partnerships and these obligations are
sufficient to meet the narrow requirements of section 523(a)(4)”).
59JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Tamis (In re Tamis), 398 B.R. 124, 130 (Bankr. D. N.J. 2008) (holding
officers and directors of insolvent corporation owed a fiduciary duty to the creditors of the corporation);
Berres v. Bruning (In re Bruning), 143 B.R. 253, 256 (D. Colo. 1992) (holding California common law
creates a fiduciary relationship between the officers and directors of an insolvent corporation and its
creditors).
60In re Garland, 501 B.R. 195, 201 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 2013) (noting that the debtor misappropriated
assets while acting as a managing member and that under New York law, managers of limited liability
companies owe fiduciary duties to the company and to members of the company); McCarthy v. Nature’s
Wing Fin Design, LLC (In re McCarthy), Nos. CC-10-1445-PaMkB, CC-10-1446-PaMkB, 2011 WL
4485866, p. 8 (9th Cir. BAP Aug. 10, 2011).
61Selenske v. Selenske (In re Selenske), 103 B.R. 200, 203-04 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1989).
62Consumers Produce Co. v. Masdea (In re Masdea), 307 B.R. 466, 474 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2004).
63In re Hemmeter, 242 F.3d at 1190.
64In re Reliance Ins. Co. v. Miller, 144 Fed. Appx. 966, 972 (4th Cir. 2005).
65Stowe v. Bologna (In re Bologna), 206 B.R. 628 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997) (finding that a debtor land-
lord holding a security deposit under a Massachusetts statute was acting in a fiduciary capacity); Alaska
Teamster-Employer Pension Trust v. Wise (In re Wise), 120 B.R. 537 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1990) (deeming a
debtor a landlord with respect to security deposits under Alaska’s Uniform Residential Landlord and
Tenant Act).
66In re Ragsdale, 780 F.2d at 796 (finding a fiduciary capacity based on the California Corporate Code
and case law).
67In re McGee, 353 F.3d 537 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding fiduciary capacity based on the Chicago Munici-
pal Code addressing a landlord’s obligations to hold a tenants security deposit).
68In re Masdea, 307 B.R. at 474 (finding a fiduciary capacity based on the Perishable Agricultural
Commodities Act, 7 U.S.C. § 499e(c)(2)).
69Poynter v. Great American Ins. Co., 482 B.R. 557, 563 (W.D. Ky 2012) (finding a fiduciary capacity
based on a debtor that acted as a general contractor and signed an agreement of indemnity).
70Kubota Tractor Corp. v. Strack (In re Strack), 524 F.3d 493, 500 (4th Cir. 2008).
71In re Bullock, 670 F.3d at 1164 (Bullock was the trustee of his father’s trust).
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constitutes a “fiduciary capacity” broadening over time, the mental standard
from Bullock will apply to an ever-greater universe of debtor conduct.
C. THE BASICS OF BULLOCK
1. Bullock Factual Background
The facts of Bullock allowed the Court to define defalcation without ad-
dressing the meaning of fiduciary capacity.72 Bullock arose out of a dispute
between some of the beneficiaries of a living trust and their brother, a non-
professional trustee of the trust.73  In 1978, a father created an irrevocable
living trust in favor of his five children and named one of his sons, Randy
Bullock (“Mr. Bullock”), the trustee.74  The sole asset of the trust was a life
insurance policy on the life of the father.75  The trust instrument permitted
the trustee to borrow funds from the insurer against the policy’s value in only
two situations: (1) to pay the life insurance premiums; and (2) to satisfy a
beneficiary’s request for withdrawal.76  Mr. Bullock was unaware of the exis-
tence of the trust or of his position as trustee until his father contacted him
to request a loan for the benefit of Mr. Bullock’s mother.77  Mr. Bullock sub-
sequently borrowed funds against the cash value of the life insurance policy
on three separate occasions and loaned the proceeds to his mother and to
business entities in which he had an interest.78  The loans accrued interest at
the insurance company’s determined rate of 6%.79  Although all of the bor-
rowed funds were repaid to the trust along with 6% interest,80 the trust did
not earn any profits on the loans.81  BankChampaign, N.A.
(“BankChampaign”) was eventually placed as the successor trustee of the
trust.82
2. Bullock Procedural Background
Two of Mr. Bullock’s brothers, who were beneficiaries of the trust, sued
Mr. Bullock in Illinois state court alleging Mr. Bullock breached his fiduciary
72Specifically, the fact that Mr. Bullock was the trustee of an express trust. Id. at 1164 (stating “[t]he
parties do not dispute that the judgment debt arose from conduct that occurred while Bullock was acting
in a fiduciary capacity (i.e., while he was the trustee of his father’s trust)”).
73BankChampaign, N.A. v. Bullock, No. 10-80003, 2010 WL 2202826, *3 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. May 27,
2010).
74Id.; Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1757.
75Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1757.
76In re Bullock, 670 F.3d at 1162.
77Bullock v. Bullock, No. 99-CH-34, Order (Circuit Court for the Fifth Judicial Circuit of Ill. Filed
December 23, 2002).
78BankChampaign, N.A., 2010 WL 2202826, at *3.
79Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1757.
80Id.
81BankChampaign, N.A., 2010 WL 2202826, at *3.
82Second Amended Complaint filed July 10, 2001 in Bullock v. Bullock, No. 99-CH-34 (Circuit Court
for the Fifth Judicial Circuit of Ill.).
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duty as trustee of the trust and that any profits earned by Mr. Bullock and
his mother as a result of the loans should be turned over to the trust.83  The
Illinois court found Mr. Bullock did “not appear to have had a malicious mo-
tive in borrowing funds from the trust,” but held that “neither the facts and
circumstances surrounding the loans nor the motives of [Mr. Bullock] can
excuse him from liability.  There has been a clear breach of [Mr. Bullock’s]
fiduciary duty, and the Plaintiffs are entitled to damages.”84  The court noted
that the loans were “inappropriate,” acknowledged that Mr. Bullock had “in
fact, repaid the loans,” and ordered Mr. Bullock to pay the trust “$250,000 to
represent the benefits he received from his breaches” plus additional fees and
costs.85
Mr. Bullock was unable to pay the court-ordered payment and filed a
voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.86
BankChampaign filed an adversary proceeding to determine the dis-
chargeability of the Illinois court-ordered payment under § 523(a)(4) of the
Bankruptcy Code.87  Based on collateral estoppel, the bankruptcy court held
the debt was nondischargeable because the issues determined by the Illinois
court were the same as those arising in the adversary proceeding.88  Mr. Bul-
lock appealed to the federal district court, which affirmed, finding “nothing
erroneous in the [b]ankruptcy court’s determination that the Illinois state
court judgment was non-dischargeable” and “that it was collaterally estopped
from reopening [the] issue.”89
Mr. Bullock then appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, which also affirmed,
finding that Mr. Bullock’s conduct constituted defalcation.90  After a brief
summary of the split in the federal circuits, the Eleventh Circuit noted that
defalcation “requires more than mere negligence” and requires “a known
breach of a fiduciary duty, such that the conduct can be characterized as
objectively reckless.”91  By requiring a showing of recklessness by the fiduci-
ary, the Eleventh Circuit consciously noted it was aligning itself with the
Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits.92  In characterizing Mr. Bullock’s conduct
as objectively reckless, the Eleventh Circuit inferred culpability as follows:
83Id.
84Bullock v. Bullock, No. 99-CH-34, Order (Circuit Court for the Fifth Judicial Circuit of Ill. Filed
December 23, 2002).
85Id.
86Bankruptcy Petition No. 09-84300-JAC7, filed October 21, 2009 in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for
the Northern District of Alabama.
87BankChampaign, N.A., 2010 WL 2202826, *1.
88Id.
89Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., No. CV-10-J-1905-NE (N.D. Ala. March 22, 2011).
90In re Bullock, 670 F.3d at 1164.
91Id. at 1166.
92Id.
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“[b]ecause Mr. Bullock was the trustee of the trust, he certainly should have
known that he was engaging in self-dealing, given that he knowingly benefit-
ted from the loans.”93
3. Bullock Supreme Court Decision
Mr. Bullock petitioned for,94 and the U.S. Supreme Court granted,95 cer-
tiorari on the question of what degree of misconduct was required to consti-
tute defalcation.  In resolving the circuit split, Bullock did not adopt a specific
standard from the federal circuits.  Instead, the Court unanimously decided
that defalcation “includes a culpable state of mind requirement”96 that in-
volves “knowledge of, or gross recklessness in respect to, the improper nature
of the relevant fiduciary behavior.”97  It can be satisfied through either (i)
“conduct that the fiduciary knows is improper,”98 or (ii) “reckless conduct of
the kind that the criminal law often treats as the equivalent,”99  meaning “the
kind set forth in the Model Penal Code.”100
Bullock’s new standard is most similar to the “extreme recklessness or
scienter” state of mind from the First and Second Circuits, but it is different
because it focuses on the Model Penal Code instead of the securities law
concept of scienter.101 Bullock compared102 the Model Penal Code’s defini-
tion of “recklessly” to scienter through the citing reference “Cf.,” which
means the “[c]ited authority supports a proposition different from the main
proposition but sufficiently analogous to lend support.”103 Bullock also cited
a Second Circuit decision for support, explaining that “at least some Circuits
93Id. (emphasis added).
94In re Bullock, 670 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed, 2012 WL 2311991 (U.S. June
14, 2012) (No. 11-1518).
95In re Bullock, 670 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S.Ct. 529 (2012), 80 U.S.L.W. 3709
(U.S. Oct. 29, 2012) (No. 11-1518).
96Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1757.
97Id.
98Id. at 1759.
99Id.
100Id.
101In a typical 10(b) securities law action, “the term ‘scienter’ refers to a mental state embracing intent
to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”  Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12 (1976).  “For the
scienter element, most courts have concluded that recklessness is sufficient.”  William H Kuehnle, On
Scienter, Knowledge, and Recklessness Under the Federal Securities Laws, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 121, 179
(1997).  In the securities law context, recklessness is defined as “an extreme departure from the standards
of ordinary care, and which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the
defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it.”  Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical
Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977) (quoting Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 428 F.
Supp. 719, 725 (W.D. Okla. 1976), vacated on other grounds, Cronin v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 619
F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1980)).
102Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1760.
103THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 1.2, at 55 (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et
al. eds., 19th ed. 2010) (emphasis added).
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have interpreted the [defalcation] statute similarly.”104  Thus, in resolving
the circuit split, Bullock established a new mental standard requirement.
Bullock quoted the Model Penal Code’s definition of recklessly but re-
phrased it to relate to the violation of a fiduciary duty:
Where actual knowledge of wrongdoing is lacking, we con-
sider conduct as equivalent if the fiduciary “consciously dis-
regards” (or is willfully blind to) “a substantial and
unjustifiable risk” that his conduct will turn out to violate a
fiduciary duty. . . .  That risk “must be of such a nature and
degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s
conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard
involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a
law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s
situation.”105
The Court gave five reasons for this heightened mental standard.  First, it
used a canon of interpretation106 that looked at the mental state required for
the other statutory terms in § 523(a)(4)—namely fraud, embezzlement and
larceny—in order to impose a mental standard in the definition of defalcation.
Second, it noted that a heightened mental standard prevented the meaning of
defalcation from being identical to its statutory neighbors of embezzlement
and larceny and made it distinguishable from fiduciary fraud.107  Third, re-
quiring a heightened mental standard was consistent with the principle that
exceptions to discharge should be confined to those plainly expressed.108
Fourth, some circuits had already imposed a similar heightened mental stan-
dard for many years without administrative or other practical difficulties.
Finally, there were no strong considerations that favored a different interpre-
tation.109 Bullock vacated the Eleventh Circuit’s judgment and remanded the
case “to permit the court to determine whether further proceedings are
needed and, if so, to apply the heightened standard that we have set forth.”110
As mentioned earlier, most of the exceptions to discharge in § 523(a) are
based on a policy concern—either the important nature of the debt or some
104Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1761.
105Id. at 1759-1760 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1985)).
106Noscitur a sociis, which means “it is known from its associates.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1668
(7th ed. 1999).
107Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1757 (stating defalcation involves neither conversion nor taking and carrying
away another’s property, nor falsity and that it may be used to refer to nonfraudulent breaches of fiduciary
duty).
108Id. at 1760.
109Id. at 1761 (noting that an opposing consideration proffered by the Government had two equally
plausible explanations and was inconclusive).
110Id.
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type of culpable conduct by the debtor.111  The characterization of a dis-
charge exception as a “bad conduct of debtor” or “nature of debt” exception is
important because it provides policy guidance to courts when applying a dis-
charge exception in the fog of new facts where the light of precedent is too
dim to be helpful.  For example, the characterization of a domestic support
obligation112 in the “type of debt” category confirms that one of the primary
reasons it is a discharge exception is because society holds the interests of the
beneficiaries of domestic support obligations, such as obligations debtors owe
to dependent children or ex-spouses, as being more important than the fresh
start of a debtor through a discharge.  Thus, when a court is asked to con-
sider whether some new type of quasi-related support obligation is a domes-
tic support obligation, it can be guided by focusing not on the debtor’s
culpable conduct in connection with the creation of the debt, but on whether
the claimant fits within the circle of beneficiaries that the discharge exception
was intended to protect.
The characterization of the discharge exception for “defalcation while act-
ing in a fiduciary capacity” has historically been unclear.  Before Bullock, one
court had ultimately concluded that defalcation by a fiduciary was a “bad
conduct of debtor” discharge exception, but noted that “[i]t is arguable that
defalcation by a fiduciary fits into [the] ‘type of debt’ category.”113  Scholars
have taken both sides of the issue.114
Bullock’s mandate of a mental state clearly places the exception in the
“bad conduct of debtor” category.115  Although there is still a significant
amount of uncertainty about the scope of a “fiduciary capacity” under
§ 523(a)(4),116 the clarification that “defalcation” is a “bad conduct of debtor”
exception puts the interests of the beneficiaries of the fiduciary relationship
in the periphery and places the debtor’s culpability as the focal point.  This
position is confirmed by Bullock’s emphasis on “the improper nature of the
relevant fiduciary behavior”117 instead of on the existence of a debt arising
from a fiduciary relationship.  In addition, when explaining the considerations
that lead to requiring a mental standard for defalcation, the Court stated that
111See Part I, Introduction.
11211 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5).
113In re Baylis, 313 F.3d at 19.
114Andrea Johnson, The Defalcation Exception to Discharge, 27 W. NEW ENG. L. REV., 93, 119 (2005)
(stating “Section 523(a)(4) is probably more like fault-based exceptions, in that it contains language that
suggests dishonesty on the part of the debtor”); Rosen, supra note 20, at 87 (asserting the defalcation
exception applies only when there is a failure to remit or account for funds or property held in an express
or technical trust and that the debtor’s type of mental state does not matter).
115Characterizing defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity as a “type of debt” category likely
would have required a simple breach of fiduciary duty and changed the focus from the debtor to the
beneficiary of the fiduciary duty.
116See Part III.A.
117Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1757 (emphasis added).
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its interpretation was “consistent with a set of statutory exceptions that
Congress normally confines to circumstances where strong, special policy
considerations, such as the presence of fault, argue for preserving the debt,
thereby benefiting, for example, a typically more honest creditor.”118  Ulti-
mately, the fact that Bullock imposed a heightened state of mind requirement
goes to the heart of a “bad conduct of debtor” exception.
III. ANALYSIS OF BULLOCK: IMPLICATIONS AND
PRECAUTIONS
This Article does not question whether Bullock chose “the correct” state
of mind for the defalcation exception to discharge.  Instead, it focuses on the
many implications and challenges from Bullock that will need to be addressed
by courts in the future.  The analysis devotes significant attention to the
Model Penal Code’s definition of “recklessly,” because it is the minimum119
mental state required to find defalcation under Bullock’s new test and the
most difficult to apply.  The analysis will start by explaining why applying
the Model Penal Code definition of recklessly to civil fiduciary law is awk-
ward.  Second, it explores the reasons the Model Penal Code’s definition of
recklessly is difficult to apply.  Third, it explains Bullock’s seemingly unwork-
able criteria involving willful blindness and offers a solution. Bullock’s impli-
cations on summary judgment proceedings and pleading requirements are also
raised.  Finally, this Article establishes an overall analytical framework to
apply Bullock’s new test.
A. THE AWKWARDNESS OF APPLYING THE MODEL PENAL CODE’S
DEFINITION OF “RECKLESSLY” TO CIVIL FIDUCIARY LAW
The Model Penal Code was a project of the American Law Institute and
was designed to provide a comprehensive and cohesive model120 for states
“that would clarify some aspects of the [criminal] law and improve upon
aspects that were irrational or unwise.”121  In a general sense, the phrase
“state of mind” refers to “a family of concepts that includes choice, voluntari-
118Id. at 1761 (emphasis added).
119Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(5) (stating that “[w]hen recklessness suffices to establish an element,
such element also is established if a person acts purposely or knowingly”).
120But see David M. Treiman, Recklessness and the Model Penal Code, 9 AM. J. CRIM. L. 281, 328-334
(1981) (explaining that “the Model Penal Code was not intended to be uniform legislation like the Uniform
Commercial Code.  All the states which have modeled their criminal codes after the Model Penal Code
have incorporated extensive modifications.  Every state which has used the Model Penal Code definition of
recklessness has modified it to some extent”).
121Kent Greenawalt, The Cultural Defense: Reflections in Light of the Model Penal Code and The
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 299, 305 (2008) (Professor Greenawalt served
as the Chief Reporter for the American Law Institute in creating the explanatory comments to the Model
Penal Code).
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ness, consciousness, belief, desire, motive, purpose, and intention.”122  Under
the Model Penal Code, each123 crime has its own type of mental state124 or
“culpability” and there are four types: purposely, knowingly, recklessly, and
negligently.125  Much like the definitions in § 101 of the Bankruptcy
Code,126 the mental state definitions in the Model Penal Code were designed
to be used with other operational provisions of the Model Penal Code.  For
example, the crime of “entrapment” in the Model Penal Code includes “mak-
ing knowingly false representations.”127  The Model Penal Code’s description
of entrapment expressly uses the defined term “knowingly,” just as the Bank-
ruptcy Code’s provision on the allowance of claims128 uses the defined term
“claim.”129  Although this type of statutory organization is a familiar and ele-
mentary concept, it is useful to recognize the context in which the Model
Penal Code’s definition of “recklessly” was designed to be used.
Bullock plucked the definition of “recklessly” from the Model Penal Code
and implanted it into the defalcation analysis.130  “The Model [Penal] Code’s
approach is based upon the view that clear analysis requires that the question
of the kind of [mental state] required to establish the commission of an of-
fense be faced separately with respect to each material element of the
crime.”131  In the Model Penal Code, the defined mental states “apply to all
the material elements of the offense, unless a contrary purpose plainly ap-
pears.”132  Unlike the Model Penal Code, where elements are described and
defined mental states are expressly used in the descriptions of the offenses,
the descriptions of fiduciary capacities are not connected to the mental states
of the Model Penal Code.  As explained earlier, there are many different
sources giving rise to the various fiduciary capacities of debtors under
122Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463, 529 (1992) (stating that “one
should avoid the fallacy of predicating mental states on some mysterious entity—‘the mind.’  People, not
minds, have beliefs, desires, and intentions”).
123Except for strict liability offenses. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05 (1962).
124Many scholars have observed that the term “mental state” is not accurate because negligence is not
truly a mental state.  Treiman, supra note 120, at 287; Karlen, Mens Rea: A New Analysis, 9 TOL. L. REV.
191, 210 (1978); G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW, 442, n. 13 (1978); W. LAFAVE & A.
SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW, 192 (1972); G. WILLIAMS, THE MENTAL ELEMENT IN CRIME,
57 (1965).
125MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1962).
12611 U.S.C. § 101.
127MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13(1)(a) (1962).
12811 U.S.C. § 502.
12911 U.S.C. § 101(5).
130This is similar to using a rubber kickball to play a soccer game.  It will work even though the
kickball was not designed for soccer.  The players will just need to adjust to the different attributes of the
ball.
131MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02 cmt. 1 (Am. Law Inst. 1985).
132MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(4) (1962).
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§ 523(a)(4).  Few if any sources expressly use the term “recklessly” when
describing the debtor’s fiduciary duties.
Moreover, fiduciary duties may not be expressed in terms of elements.
For example, in Bullock the trust instrument permitted the trustee to borrow
funds from the insurer against the policy’s value in only two situations: (1) to
pay the life insurance premiums; and (2) to satisfy a beneficiary’s request for
withdrawal.133 The trust instrument merely set forth permissible reasons to
borrow funds against the policy’s value. Many sources of fiduciary duties will
lack the Model Penal Code’s structure of using “recklessly” to modify ele-
ments of offenses.  There will rarely if ever be seamless nesting between the
Model Penal Code’s “recklessly” mental standard and the source of a debtor’s
fiduciary duty.
Although this creates some amount of “square peg in a round hole” diffi-
culty,134 Bullock provided guidance on how the mental state “recklessly” is to
be applied when determining whether there is a defalcation while acting in a
fiduciary capacity.  It is “recklessness in respect to the improper nature of the
relevant fiduciary behavior.”135  More specifically, Bullock focused on the risk
that a debtor’s “conduct will turn out to violate a fiduciary duty.”136
B. DIFFICULTIES WHEN APPLYING THE MODEL PENAL CODE’S
DEFINITION OF “RECKLESSLY”
The Model Penal Code’s definition of “recklessly” is difficult to apply
because it contains both objective and subjective standards.  It also adds a
layer of complexity by focusing on the risk of a breach of fiduciary duty,
instead of just the breach itself.  Each element of the definition of “recklessly”
will be explored.
1. Objective and Subjective Standards in the Determination of
Recklessly
In order to ensure that a debtor’s conduct was bad enough to forfeit a
discharge of debt, Bullock defined defalcation to require “an intentional
wrong,” which includes “conduct that the fiduciary knows is improper.”137
Bullock then broadened the scope of defalcation to include “reckless conduct
of the kind that the criminal law often treats as the equivalent” and “reckless
133In re Bullock, 670 F.3d at 1162.
134Comment 3 to the definition of recklessly in Section 2.02(2)(c) suggests that the term recklessly was
defined to apply to any material element, regardless of whether the element relates to the nature of the
actor’s conduct, or to the existence of the requisite attendant circumstances, or to the result that may
ensue. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02 cmt. 3 (Am. Law Inst. 1985).
135Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1757.
136Id. at 1759-1760.
137Id. at 1759.
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conduct of the kind set forth in the Model Penal Code.”138  Reaching down
across the culpability line from knowingly improper conduct to the reckless
category highlights the importance of understanding what level of awareness
a debtor must have in connection with conduct that constitutes defalcation.
As will be explained below, the Model Penal Code’s definition of recklessly
requires both subjective and objective determinations.  The implications of
Bullock are thus best understood through the distinction between the objec-
tive and subjective standards that are used when determining awareness of
risk.
i. The Difference Between Objective and Subjective Standards
The Court’s earlier opinion in Farmer v. Brennan139 provides a helpful
framework for distinguishing objective and subjective standards.140  Al-
though Farmer was an Eighth Amendment case relating to the standard for
deliberate indifference, its distinction between objective and subjective stan-
dards is useful.
According to Farmer, in an objective standard, a person is reckless if the
person “acts or (if the person has a duty to act) fails to act in the face of an
unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it
should be known.”141  This means a person is deemed reckless if the risk is at
a sufficiently obvious level that it should have been known, regardless of
whether the person actually was aware of the risk.142
But under a subjective standard, Farmer provides that a person is reckless
when he “disregards a risk of harm of which he is aware.”143  A subjective
standard is about the actual thoughts of the actor.  That is, under a purely
subjective standard, the person “must both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he
must also draw the inference.”144  This means there is no recklessness under a
subjective standard if a serious risk of harm is obvious but no inference can be
made that the actor was actually aware of the risk.145  Under Farmer, circum-
stantial evidence showing a person “must have known” about the risk of harm
138Id.
139Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
140See Piamba Cortex v. American Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1290-1291 (11th Cir. 1999) (using
the structure of Farmer v. Brennan to decide a case under the Warsaw Convention).
141Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836.
142Piamba Cortex, 177 F.3d at 1290-1291 (stating “[t]he objective test is satisfied if a grave risk is
sufficiently obvious, because the person ‘should have’ been aware of the risk regardless of whether he
actually recognized it”).
143Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
144Id.
145Id. (stating “[t]hat a trier of fact may infer knowledge from the obvious . . . does not mean that it
must do so”).
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is sufficient to permit a trier of fact to infer146 that the person had actual
knowledge of the risk of harm (meaning he drew the inference).147 Farmer
warned however, that “courts should be careful to ensure that the require-
ment of subjective culpability is not lost.  It is not enough merely to find that
a reasonable person would have known, or that the defendant should have
known.”148
Regardless of how reckless is defined, Farmer provides two useful stan-
dards for evaluating awareness of risk.  First, an objective standard is a legal
norm based on what a “reasonable person would have known” or what the
“litigant should have known,” rather than what the litigant consciously
thought, believed or understood.  A subjective standard is based on what the
litigant was actually aware of and may be satisfied by circumstantial evidence
showing that the “litigant must have known.”
ii. Objective and Subjective Standards in the Tort
Restatements
The tort restatements provide a good illustration of the difficulty in ap-
plying objective and subjective standards of awareness of risk.  The Restate-
ment of Torts was first published in 1934 and the Restatement (Second) of
Torts in 1964.149  Despite having the benefit of a standard tort law definition
of recklessness for many years, both courts and scholars have called the term
nebulous and fraught with misunderstanding.150  As one scholar observed, “it
appears that courts are applying a sort of moral intuition in drawing the lines
between recklessness and other types of conduct.”151  The judicial quandary
arising from attempts to reconcile objective and subjective standards of
awareness risk has been described as follows:
146Infer means a deduction based on evidence.
147Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842-843.
148Id. at 843, n.8.
149RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 500 (1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500,
(1965).
150Burnett v. City of Adrian, 326 N.W.2d 810, 820 (Mich. 1982) (stating the definition of recklessness
was “fraught with misunderstanding”); Jim Hasenfus, Comment, The Role of Recklessness in American
Systems of Comparative Fault, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 399, 400 n.7 (1982) (stating the various labels applied to
recklessness have “led to considerable confusion”); Randolph Stuart Sergent, Gross, Reckless, Wanton, and
Indifferent: Gross Negligence in Maryland Civil Law, 30 U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 2 (2000) (stating the defini-
tion of recklessness remains nebulous); Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, The Wreckage of Recklessness, 86
WASH. U. L. REV. 111, 134 (2008) (stating “[c]ourts are unsure whether recklessness is closer to inten-
tional tort or negligence, and unsure whether the differences between recklessness and whichever pole it
abuts are differences of kind or of degree”).
151Rapp, supra note 150, at 134 (stating “the confusing and muddled articulation of the doctrine of
recklessness in the First and Second Restatements has left room for courts to apply naked intuition to the
cases before them.  With the doctrine itself hopelessly ill-defined, courts have not produced systematically
coherent jurisprudence in the area”).
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Courts have wrestled with whether recklessness can be
proven even in the absence of conscious awareness of risk on
the part of a defendant. . . .  It is generally undisputed that
recklessness requires some level of consciousness; what con-
fuses courts is whether a conscious action without a con-
scious appreciation of risk will be sufficient to state such a
claim.  Some courts have described a defendant’s conscious
awareness of risk as “vital” and “crucial” in establishing reck-
lessness.  Other courts have taken the middle ground: recog-
nizing that while consciousness of risk is required, such
consciousness can be implied or constructive, proven by the
circumstances confronting the defendant rather than any di-
rect evidence of cognitive recognition of risk.152
In defining reckless disregard of safety, both the First and Second Re-
statement of Torts define recklessness to include an objective standard of
awareness of risk.  They require a person to act or fail to act “having reason
to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize” that the risk
exists.153  This objective standard infers an awareness of risk because a rea-
sonable person would have been aware.  It focuses on whether a typical per-
son would have realized the risk.154  This means a court could find a person
was reckless even if the person was not consciously aware of the risk because
the person merely had reason to know.  In other words, under the First and
Second Restatements, a finding of recklessness is merited because the person
“failed to drawn an inference that a reasonable person would have drawn.”155
One of the restatement comments explains:
In order that the actor’s conduct may be reckless, it is not
necessary that he himself recognize it as being extremely dan-
gerous.  His inability to realize the danger may be due to his
own reckless temperament, or to the abnormally favorable
results of previous conduct of the same sort.  It is enough
that he knows or has reason to know of circumstances which
would bring home to the realization of the ordinary, reasonable
man the highly dangerous character of his conduct.156
The First and Second Restatement’s approach is similar to the “objective
recklessness” standard from the Eleventh Circuit that Bullock rejected.  The
152Rapp, supra note 150, at 147-148.
153RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS, § 500 (1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500
(1965).
154RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965).
155RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: Phys. & Emot. Harm § 2 cmt. c (2010).
156RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500, cmt. c (1964) (emphases added).
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Eleventh Circuit found Bullock had committed a defalcation “[b]ecause Bul-
lock was the trustee of the trust, he certainly should have known that he was
engaging in self-dealing, given that he knowingly benefitted from the
loans.”157 Bullock rejected this type of objective “should have known” stan-
dard because it was not culpable enough to forfeit a discharge of debt.158
The Restatement (Third) of Torts, which was published in 2010, takes a
different approach.159  Under the First and Second Restatements, a person
can be found reckless “whose only fault consists of the failure to draw an
inference that a reasonable person would have drawn.”160  The Restatement
(Third) of Torts treats that type of fault as “too ordinary to justify a finding
of recklessness.”161  It therefore mixed in a subjective aspect, stating that a
person acts recklessly if the person “knows facts that make the risk obvious
to another in the person’s situation.”162  This definition is a hybrid of sorts.
It is objective in the sense that it is based on the obviousness to “another”
hypothetical person, yet it is subjective because the hypothetical person is
placed in the litigant’s situation.  A restatement comment explains:
The obviousness requirement . . . does not require that the
risk be obvious to all, but rather obvious to others in the
actor’s situation. . . .  If, for example, the actor is a 10-year-
old child, the question is whether the risk is obvious to other
actors of the same age.  While inexperience and mental disa-
bility are ordinarily not taken into account in assessing
whether the actor’s conduct is negligent, when the issue is
the actor’s recklessness the question to be considered is
whether the risk would have been obvious to other begin-
ners or others suffering from a like mental disability.163
The Third Restatement’s definition of recklessness adds a significant subjec-
tive aspect, but it does not entirely reach the level of a pure subjective stan-
dard of awareness of risk because it does not require that the person actually
be aware of the risk (or the inference from circumstantial evidence that the
litigant must have known).  Here again, Bullock did not look to the tort re-
statements’ approach to recklessness because the level of fault was too shal-
157In re Bullock, 670 F.3d at 1166 (emphasis added).
158Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1759 (remanding the case “to permit the court to determine whether further
proceedings are needed and, if so, to apply the heightened standard that we have set forth”).
159RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: Phys. & Emot. Harm § 2 (2010).  The drafters of the Third
Restatement described defining recklessness as “especially difficult.”  Harvey S. Perlman & Gary T.
Schwartz, General Principles, 10 KAN J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 8, 10 (2000).
160RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: Phys. & Emot. Harm § 2 cmt. c (2010).
161Id. at § 2 cmt. c.
162Id. at § 2.
163Id. at § 2 cmt. c.
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low—meaning the degree of culpability was not bad enough to forfeit a
discharge of debt.  The Court turned instead to the criminal law.
iii. The Objective and Subjective Aspects of the Model Penal
Code’s Definition of Recklessly
The Model Penal Code’s definition of recklessly requires both objective
and subjective determinations.  It defines recklessly as follows:
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element
of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will
result from his conduct.  The risk must be of such a nature
and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the
actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him, its dis-
regard involves a gross deviation from the standard of con-
duct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s
situation.164
Based on the words “consciously disregards,” “purpose of the actor’s con-
duct,” and “circumstances known to him,” a purely subjective standard ap-
plies to whether the debtor was aware of the risk.165  But a hybrid of
objective and subjective standards applies to the determination of whether (i)
the risk was substantial and unjustifiable and (ii) its disregard amounted to a
gross deviation.  The objective aspect derives from the words “substantial
and unjustifiable” and the hypothetical “law-abiding person.”166  The subjec-
tive aspect comes from consideration of the actor’s conduct in the context of
the actor’s situation as well as the hypothetical law-abiding person being
placed “in the actor’s situation.”167
2. Substantial and Unjustifiable Risk
In order to meet the Model Penal Code’s definition of recklessness, a
debtor must be aware of a risk that is both “substantial and unjustifiable.”168
The drafters of the Model Penal Code viewed the attributes of “substantial”
and “unjustifiable” as hydraulic-like sliding factors, explaining that “less sub-
stantial risks might suffice for liability if there is no pretense of any justifica-
164MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1962).
165Robin Charlow, Wilful Ignorance and Criminal Culpability, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1351, 1380 (1992)
(stating “[i]n the case of recklessness, the actor must be subjectively aware of the risk he faces, but the
substantiality, unjustifiability, or possibility of the risk, whichever is required, is objectively measured”);
but see Treiman, supra note 120, at 328-334 (stating “[r]ecklessness is more complex because it has both
subjective (conscious disregard or aware of and consciously disregards) and objective (substantial and
unjustifiable risk, gross deviation from the standard of conduct of a law-abiding/reasonable person)
aspects”).
166MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1962).
167 Id.
168Id.
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tion for running the risk.”169
i. Substantial Risk
The requirement that the risk be “substantial” involves both the
probability and significance of the risk.  As to probability, the Model Penal
Code requires something less than “practical certainty.”170  As for the signifi-
cance of the risk, one author suggested that the requirement of substantiality
might serve to exclude “de minimis violations of the law.”171  In the civil
fiduciary context, this could be analogized to minor or immaterial breaches of
fiduciary duties.
One court explained the mixture of probability and significance (or mag-
nitude) of risk as follows:
A risk does not have to be “more likely than not to occur” or
“probable” in order to be substantial.  A risk may be substan-
tial even if the chance that the harm will occur is well below
fifty percent.  Some risks may be substantial even if they
carry a low degree of probability because the magnitude of
the harm is potentially great.  For example, if a person holds
a revolver with a single bullet in one of the chambers, points
the gun at another’s head and pulls the trigger, then the risk
of death is substantial even though the odds that death will
result are no better than one in six. . . .  Conversely, a rela-
tively high probability that a very minor harm will occur
probably does not involve a “substantial” risk.  Thus, in or-
der to determine whether a risk is substantial, the court
must consider both the likelihood that harm will occur and
the magnitude of potential harm, mindful that a risk may be
“substantial” even if the odds of the harm occurring are
lower than fifty percent.172
Turning to the bankruptcy context, the Bullock Court focused on the risk
that a debtor’s “conduct will turn out to violate a fiduciary duty.”173  In
making this determination, courts should consider the probability that the
fiduciary debtor’s conduct will violate a fiduciary duty and the significance or
magnitude of the pertinent fiduciary duty.  This analysis focuses on how sub-
stantial the risk was.  It is different than the threshold question of whether a
169MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02 cmt. 3 (Am. Law Inst. 1985).
170Compare the definitions of knowledge and recklessly. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(2)(b)(ii) and
2.02(2)(c) (1962).
171Treiman, supra note 120, at 337-338.
172People v. Hall, 999 P.2d 207, 217-218 (Colo. 2000) (involving criminal case under a statute that
adopted the Model Penal Code’s definition of recklessly) (internal citations omitted).
173Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1759.
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debtor was acting “in a fiduciary capacity”174 under § 523(a)(4) at the time of
the defalcation.
ii. Unjustifiable Risk
In a criminal context, a risk is unjustifiable when “the social costs out-
weigh the benefits of the risk.”175  “To determine whether a risk is justifiable
one must balance the potential harm against the potential gain.”176  The
Model Penal Code contains many examples of justifiable177 risks, such as ne-
cessity,178 use of force in self-protection,179 use of force in law enforce-
ment,180 and possibly consent.181
In a fiduciary debtor context, justifiability could include factors such as
the interests of the beneficiaries of the relevant fiduciary duty, whether the
debtor’s motive in disregarding the risk related to a proper purpose (such as
furthering the interests of the beneficiaries as opposed to self-dealing), and
whether the beneficiaries of the fiduciary duty consented to the fiduciary
debtor’s conduct.
iii. The Nature and Degree of the Risk
The Model Penal Code’s definition of recklessly contains several consid-
erations in connection with evaluation of the risk.  The first is the nature of
the actor’s conduct.182  This consideration requires the actor’s conduct be
identified so that it can be compared to the “standard of conduct that a law-
abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.”183  The second consid-
eration is the purpose of the actor’s conduct.184  Under the comments,
“[e]ven substantial risks, it is clear, may be created without recklessness
when the actor is seeking to serve a proper purpose, as when a surgeon per-
forms an operation that he knows is very likely to be fatal but reasonably
thinks to be necessary because the patient has no other, safer chance.”185  The
17411 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4).
175G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW, § 4.3, p. 261 (1978).
176Treiman, supra note 120, at 334 (arguing that consideration of factors utilized to determine unrea-
sonableness of risk contained in the Restatement (Second) of Torts should be appropriate for determina-
tion of whether a risk is unjustifiable).
177MARKUS D. DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW MODEL PENAL CODE, 186 (Foundation Press 2002).
178MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(1)(a) (1962) (stating “[c]onduct which the actor believes to be neces-
sary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to another is justifiable, provided that the harm or evil sought to
be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense
charged. . .”).
179Id. at § 3.04(1).
180Id. at § 3.07(1).
181Id. at § 2.11(1).
182Id. at § 2.02(2)(c).
183Id.
184Id.
185MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02 cmt. 3 (Am. Law Inst. 1985).
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final consideration is the circumstances known to the actor.186  Each of these
considerations helps ensure there is sufficient culpability associated with the
actor’s conduct.
3. The Debtor Consciously Disregarded the Risk
Standing alone, a debtor’s awareness of a substantial and unjustifiable risk
does not amount to recklessness.  The risk must be “consciously
disregarded.”187
i. Conscious Disregard
Acting recklessly is “conscious risk creation.”188  It involves a state of
awareness of risk—that is of “a probability less than substantially cer-
tainty.”189  It is a purely subjective standard.
Awareness of a risk is different than the circumstances known to the
actor.  “Being aware or conscious of something suggests that the something is
in the person’s thoughts at the moment.”190  Recklessness “describes a will-
ingness to act in the face of a perceived probability of the existence or crea-
tion of a particular fact, circumstance, or result.”191  “[C]onscious disregard
should be viewed as requiring a response that the actor makes realizing that it
might be inappropriate.  Failure to perceive the potential inappropriateness of
the response would constitute only negligence.”192  Hence, the Model Penal
Code’s definition of recklessly excludes from culpability a debtor’s inability to
be aware of risk, even if a reasonable person in the same situation would have
recognized the risk.  This heightened mental state ensures a debtor’s conduct
is bad enough to justify an exception to discharge.  If circumstantial evidence
is being used to infer that the debtor was actually aware of the risk (con-
scious of it), the evidence needs to show the debtor “must have known”
about the risk.
ii. Gross Deviation
“[T]he culpability of disregarding a risk derives from a conscious depar-
186MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1962).
187MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1962).
188MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02 cmt. 3 (Am. Law Inst. 1985).
189Id.
190Treiman, supra note 120, at 334 (“Knowledge, on the other hand, may be in a person’s conscious
thoughts, or may be something tucked away in the person’s memory.  Obviously we all have considerably
more knowledge than we have in our conscious thoughts at any moment.  We may know something
without being currently aware or conscious of the fact or idea. . . .  Since the Model Penal Code concept of
recklessness utilizes awareness rather than knowledge of the risk, this would appear to exclude the situa-
tion in which the actor had knowledge of a risk, but was not aware of it at the moment.  Having knowl-
edge of a risk involved in specific conduct, but not being aware of the risk at the moment, that is, not
stopping to think of the consequences, may be negligent but it is not reckless”).
191Ira P. Robbins, The Ostrich Instruction: Deliberate Ignorance as a Criminal Mens Rea, 81 CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 191, 221-222 (1990).
192Treiman, supra note 120, at 371.
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ture from a level of legally permissible risk-taking.”193  The disregard must be
“a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person
would observe in the actor’s situation.”194  The comparison of the actor’s
conduct to a law-abiding person is a question of fact.  The comments explain:
[T]he jury must evaluate the actor’s conduct and determine
whether it should be condemned.  The [Model Penal] Code
proposes, therefore, that this difficulty be accepted frankly,
and that the jury be asked to measure the substantiality and
unjustifiability of the risk by asking whether its disregard,
given the actor’s perceptions, involved a gross deviation from
the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person in the ac-
tor’s situation would observe.195
The Model Penal Code does not provide a definition for “gross deviation.”
State courts have defined it as a “great or substantial deviation, not just a
slight or moderate deviation”196 and more than “a deviation that was simply
unreasonable or thoughtless.”197  Montana statutorily defines the term
“gross-deviation” in its definition of criminal negligence as “a deviation that is
considerably greater than lack of ordinary care.”198  One scholar described the
difference between an ordinary deviation and a gross deviation as represent-
ing “a value judgment which cannot be reduced to a legal formula.”199  In a
fiduciary context, in order to amount to a gross deviation, the fiduciary
debtor’s conduct should be beyond a simple breach of a trustee’s duty of
prudent administration200 and a reasonable exercise of a trustee’s discretion-
ary powers.
iii. Law-Abiding Person
In a criminal law context, the comparison to a hypothetical “law-abiding”
person makes sense.  It is the criminal law’s equivalent201 to a reasonable
person from tort law.  One scholar believes “[i]t is unlikely that there is any
193G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW, § 4.3, p. 261 (1978).
194MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1962).
195MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02 cmt. 3 (Am. Law Inst. 1985).
196State v. Garcia, 838 A.2d 1064, 1075 (Conn. App. 2004).
197State v. Littlefield, 876 A.2d 712, 728 (N.H. 2005).
198MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(43) (2011).
199Treiman, supra note 120, at 350 (stating “whether a conscious disregard of a risk is a gross deviation
from a legal norm is a question of fact for the jury”).
200Uniform Trust Code, drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, § 804 (last revised or amended in 2010) (“A trustee shall administer the trust as a prudent person
would, by considering the purposes, terms, distributional requirements, and other circumstances of the
trust.  In satisfying this standard, the trustee shall exercise reasonable care, skill, and caution.”)
201Actually, the Model Penal Code’s definition of “negligently” also makes the gross deviation compari-
son to a “reasonable person.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (1962).
\\jciprod01\productn\A\ABK\88-1\abk102.txt unknown Seq: 28 14-APR-14 10:04
30 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 88
remaining practical significance to this variation.”202  Another scholar claims
the difference is that the culpability for recklessness derives from a “choice to
violate a legal imperative”203 but culpability for negligence follows “the fail-
ure to meet reasonable standards of attentiveness.”204
A law-abiding person is one who knows the law and complies with it.
As for knowledge of the law, the maxim “ignorance of the law is no ex-
cuse”205 is a familiar concept206 and “[n]o doctrine is more universal or of
more ancient vintage in the law than that ignorance of the law excuses no
one.”207  It is commonly applied in a criminal context208 but rarely in one that
is civil.209  The basic proposition is that knowledge of the law defining an
offense is often not itself an element of the offense.210  In other words, it does
not matter if an actor is not aware of the law that sets forth the definition of
the crime in question.211
There are strong policy grounds supporting the rule in criminal law.  If all
202Treiman, supra note 120, at 334 (noting “[o]nly two states, Hawaii and New Hampshire, have
retained the term law-abiding for recklessness, and Hawaii eliminated the difference between recklessness
and negligence by using the term law-abiding for both.  Every other state has eliminated the difference
between recklessness and negligence”).
203G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW, 262, (1978).
204Id.
205Black’s Dictionary provides that the legal maxim “Ignorantia juris non excusat” means ignorance of
the law does not excuse.
206Lambert v. People of the State of California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957) (stating “[t]he rule that
‘ignorance of the law will not excuse’ is deep in our law. . ..”)
207People v. Bowman, 320 P.2d 70, 77 (Cal. App. 1958).
208Cheek v. U.S., 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991) (stating “[t]he general rule that ignorance of the law or a
mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution is deeply rooted in the American legal system”).
209Frank P. Randazzo v. Harris Bank Palatine, N.A., 262 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating that
“[a]lthough the principle that ‘ignorance of the law is no excuse’ has been unquestioned in Anglo-Ameri-
can criminal jurisprudence, the development of an analogous principle in civil matters always has been
subject to more limitations because of the development of equitable principles in chancery practice.”);
Robert A. Prentice, Clinical Trial Results, Physicians, and Insider Trading, 20 J. LEGAL MED. 195, 201-
202 (1999) (stating “[g]iven that ignorance of the law is no excuse, simple lack of knowledge about the
particulars of insider trading law generally is not an excuse in an insider trading civil or criminal action.
The law is clear that the SEC, in a civil case, or the Department of Justice, in a criminal case, need not
show that insider trading defendants specifically intended to violate the law.”); Longe v. Boise Cascade
Corp., 762 A.2d 1248, 1258 (Vt. 2000)  (holding employer had no duty to ensure employee understood his
rights under Vermont’s workers’ compensation statute).
210Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(9) and explanatory note (stating “[n]either knowledge nor recklessness
or negligence as to whether conduct constitutes an offense or as to the existence, meaning or application of
the law determining the elements of an offense is an element of such offense, unless the definition of the
offense or the Code so provide”).
211Comment 11 explains: “The proper arena for the principle that ignorance or mistake of law does not
afford an excuse is thus with respect to the particular law that sets forth the definition of the crime in
question.  It is knowledge of that law that is normally not a part of the crime, and it is ignorance or
mistake as to that law that is denied defensive significance by this subsection of the Code and by the
traditional common law approach to the issue.” MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02 cmt.
11 (Am. Law Inst. 1985) (emphasis in original).
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defendants were entitled to raise ignorance of the law as a defense, it would
become a shield for the guilty because an inquiry into whether a defendant
was at fault in his ignorance would be too complicated and difficult.212  Ra-
tional enforcement and publication of law contribute to voluntary compli-
ance, which leads to a more ordered society.213  Society must presume such
knowledge for an ordered state.214  The rule also encourages individuals to
learn their obligations.215
In the Model Penal Code’s definition of recklessly, the comparison is be-
tween the actor’s conduct and the conduct that a hypothetical law-abiding
person “would observe in the actor’s situation.”216  In a defalcation analysis
under Bullock, comparing to a “law-abiding person” is problematic because the
context is the civil law of fiduciaries, not the criminal law.  Unlike the crimi-
nal law, where knowledge of the law is constructively imposed, a fiduciary
debtor having civil fiduciary duties may not be deemed to know those duties
and may in fact be unaware of the entire scope of such duties.  Even where
constructive knowledge of fiduciary duties is imposed,217 Bullock’s new stan-
dard requiring the debtor have subjective awareness of the risk changes the
law and would preclude the imposition of constructive knowledge of fiduci-
ary duties (because that would result in an objective “should have known”
standard).
As for the meaning of a “law-abiding person”—on one hand, “the stan-
dard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situa-
tion”218 could be equivalent to what a perfect fiduciary would do.  That is, a
“law-abiding person” is interpreted to mean a fiduciary debtor whose conduct
is fully compliant with the technical letter of all applicable fiduciary duties
212WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.6(d) (2d. ed.); Livingston Hall & Selig J.
Seligman, Mistake of Law and Mens Rea, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 641, 646-648 (1941) (observing that adminis-
tration of justice would be virtually impossible).
213Mark D. Yochum, The Death of a Maxim: Ignorance of Law Is No Excuse (Killed By Money, Guns
and a Little Sex) “Ignorance of the Law Excuses No Man; Not that All Men Know the Law, But Because
It’s An Excuse Every Man Will Plead, and No Man Can Tell How To Refute Him,” 13 ST. JOHN’S J.
LEGAL COMMENT, 635, 638 (1999).
214Id. at 638 (citing OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 48 (Little, Brown, and Co.
1909 (1881)).
215WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.6(d) (2d. ed.) (stating “conviction of de-
fendants for violation of new or forgotten criminal laws serves to bring home to the general public the
existence of the rules and aids in establishing them as the social mores of the community”).
216MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1962).
217In re Storie, 216 B.R. at 287 (stating “[c]ourts also agree that fiduciaries are charged with knowl-
edge of their duties and of applicable law, and that a subjective intent to breach a fiduciary duty or a law is
irrelevant. . . .  The requirement that a fiduciary be charged with knowledge of his or her duties and of the
law ‘prevents ignorance of the law from becoming a defense to nondischargeability and provides an incen-
tive for individuals . . . who are engaged in occupations subject to special statutes to apprise themselves of
their obligations under the law”).
218MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1962).
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(including those duties imposed by private agreements).  The concern with
equating “law-abiding person” with a “perfect fiduciary” is that the recklessly
test is measuring whether there is a “gross deviation” or difference between
the fiduciary debtor’s disregard and the standard of conduct that a law-abid-
ing person would observe in the actor’s situation.  If “law-abiding person” is
interpreted to mean a “perfect fiduciary,” it would make a finding of gross
deviation more likely because it furthers the distance between the fiduciary
debtor’s actual conduct compared to a level of perfect compliance (making the
difference in conduct greater because the comparison bar is being set at the
highest level).
On the other hand, equating a “law-abiding person” to a “reasonable fidu-
ciary” would ratchet up the level of culpability necessary to constitute a
gross deviation, because the starting point for the comparison of whether
there was a gross deviation would be something short of perfect compliance.
The bankruptcy policy of protecting a debtor’s fresh start and ensuring suffi-
ciently bad conduct to lose a discharge favor the interpretation of “law-abid-
ing person” to mean a “reasonable fiduciary.”
C. THE ANALYTICAL PROBLEMS ARISING FROM BULLOCK’S
INFUSION OF “WILLFULLY BLIND” INTO THE MODEL PENAL
CODE’S DEFINITION OF RECKLESSLY
Assuming there is a substantial and unjustifiable risk but the debtor has
not “consciously disregarded” it, there may still be a finding of recklessness
based on willful blindness.  In reciting the Model Penal Code’s definition of
recklessly, Bullock inserted a very confusing parenthetical.  The Court stated
that conduct is reckless “if the fiduciary ‘consciously disregards’ (or is willfully
blind to) ‘a substantial and unjustifiable risk.’ ”219
The words “willfully blind” are not part of the Model Penal Code’s defi-
nition of recklessly.220  In fact, the words do not appear anywhere in the
Model Penal Code.  They make a brief appearance in Comment 9 which
relates to Model Penal Code Section 2.02(7), which states: “knowledge is
established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence, unless he
actually believes that it does not exist.”221  Comment 9 explains that this
provision “deals with the situation that British commentators have denomi-
nated ‘wilful blindness’ or ‘connivance,’ the case of the actor who is aware of
the probable existence of a material fact but does not determine whether it
exists or does not exist.”222
Bullock gave a head-nod endorsement of the Model Penal Code’s defini-
219Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1759 (emphasis added).
220MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1962).
221Id. at § 2.02(7).
222MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02 cmt. 9 (Am. Law Inst. 1985).
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tion by citing Comment 9 and parenthetically noting that “the Model Penal
Code’s definition of ‘knowledge’ was designed to include ‘wilful blind-
ness.’ ”223  This phraseology is odd, because in a criminal context, the question
is more commonly about whether willful blindness can substitute for a statu-
tory requirement of knowledge, not whether knowledge encompasses willful
blindness.
Although there has been a debate by both scholars224 and courts225 on
whether “willful blindness” can substitute for knowledge, the Supreme Court
resolved the uncertainty in Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.226 hold-
ing in a patent infringement case that willful blindness can substitute for a
statutory requirement of knowledge.227
Comment 9 to the Model Penal Code explains that willful blindness
amounts to knowledge only “when what is involved is a matter of existing
fact, but not when what is involved is the result of the defendant’s conduct,
necessarily a matter of the future at the time of acting.”228 Global-Tech Ap-
pliances maintained this distinction when it prefaced its quotation of Section
2.02(7):
Later, a 1962 proposed draft of the Model Penal Code,
which has since become official, attempted to incorporate
the doctrine by defining “knowledge of the existence of a par-
ticular fact” to include a situation in which “a person is
aware of a high probability of [the fact’s] existence, unless he
actually believes that it does not exist.229
Global-Tech Appliances summarized the federal criminal jurisprudence230
223Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1759.
224Robbins, supra note 191, at 195 (arguing willful blindness constitutes recklessness, not knowledge);
Charlow, supra note 165, at 1429 (arguing formulations of willful blindness describe a mental state that is
not as blameworthy as knowledge); ROLLIN M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 776 (2d ed. 1969) (stating a
person who deliberately shuts his eyes to avoid knowing what would otherwise be obvious is treated as
having “knowledge” of the facts as they are ultimately discovered to be); GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMI-
NAL LAW, THE GENERAL PART § 57 at 159 (2d ed. 1961) (stating “[t]he rule of willful blindness is
equivalent to knowledge is essential, and is found throughout the criminal law”).
225United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that knowingly includes a
mental state in which the defendant is aware that the fact in question is highly probable but consciously
avoids enlightenment); United States v. Craig, 178 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir. 1999) (equating actual knowl-
edge with the deliberate avoidance of knowledge).
226Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011) (applying a federal statute on
induced infringement of a patent that required knowledge).
227Id. at 2068.
228MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02 cmt. 9 (Am. Law Inst. 1985).
229Global-Tech Appliances, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2069 (emphasis added).
230Id. (stating that “every Court of Appeals—with the possible exception of the District of Columbia
Circuit, . . . has fully embraced willful blindness, applying the doctrine to a wide range of criminal stat-
utes,” and explaining that “[g]iven the long history of willful blindness and its wide acceptance in the
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and held that willful blindness requires that: “(1) the defendant must subjec-
tively believe that there is a high probability that a fact exists and (2) the
defendant must take deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact.”231
Global-Tech Appliances then explained how willful blindness is different
than recklessness or negligence under the Model Penal Code:
We think these requirements give willful blindness an appro-
priately limited scope that surpasses recklessness and negli-
gence.  Under this formulation, a willfully blind defendant is
one who takes deliberate actions to avoid confirming a high
probability of wrongdoing and who can almost be said to
have actually known the critical facts.  By contrast, a reck-
less defendant is one who merely knows of a substantial and
unjustified risk of such wrongdoing, and a negligent defen-
dant is one who should have known of a similar risk but, in
fact, did not.232
Global-Tech Appliances provides a clear test for willful blindness when it
comes to the existence of a particular fact.  The analysis gets a little muddled
when one wonders if Bullock’s risk “that his conduct will turn out to violate a
fiduciary duty”233 relates to “the existence of a particular fact”234 or is “a
result of the defendant’s conduct, necessarily a matter of the future at the
time of acting.”235
The difficult question is how to reconcile Bullock’s insertion of “willfully
blind”236 in the middle of the Model Penal Code’s recklessly definition when
the Court has previously held in Global-Tech Appliances that it is not reck-
lessness. Bullock stated, “[W]e consider conduct as equivalent if the fiduciary
‘consciously disregards’ (or is willfully blind to) ‘a substantial and unjustifi-
able risk’ that his conduct will turn out to violate a fiduciary duty.”237 The
context238 and location239 of Bullock’s embedding of “willfully blind” suggests
it is an alternative to the “conscious disregard” requirement of recklessness,
not a wholesale substitute of willful blindness as a stand-alone test for defal-
cation.  So under Bullock, willful blindness cannot be substituted for reckless-
Federal Judiciary, we can see no reason why the doctrine should not apply in civil lawsuits for induced
patent infringement”).
231Id. at 2070.
232Id. at 2070-2071 (emphasis added).
233Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1759.
234MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02 cmt. 9 (Am. Law Inst. 1985).
235Id.
236Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1759.
237Id..
238Bullock used a parenthetical and the conjunction “or” to introduce the terms “willfully blind.”
239Bullock placed the parenthetical “willfully blind” directly after the “consciously disregards” portion
of the Model Penal Code’s recklessly definition.
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ness as a whole.  It can only replace the “conscious disregard” element of
recklessness.
Implanting “willfully blind” as an alternate to “consciously disregard”
causes analytical problems.  Recklessly’s “conscious disregard” is about aware-
ness of risk, “that is of a probability less than substantial certainty.”240 Will-
ful blindness on the other hand, requires a person be aware of a “high
probability that a fact exists.”241  Both recklessness and willful blindness in-
volve awareness, but the subject of the awareness is different.  The focus of
willful blindness under the Model Penal Code is on how certain a person is
about a fact.242  A fact may be different than a risk.  Moreover, Bullock stated
that reckless conduct includes a fiduciary being willfully blind to a substantial
and unjustifiable risk.243  Taken literally, this results in seemingly unwork-
able244 criteria that requires a high probability245 of a probability less than
substantial certainty.246
For example, “if there is no social utility in doing what he is doing, one
might be reckless though the chances of harm are something less than 1%.”247
Yet, “ ‘high probability’ entails well over a 51% chance of harm.”248  In addi-
tion, a mistaken belief may negate culpability under willful blindness but not
under recklessness.249  It is also unclear how the two elements of willful
blindness interact with the requirements of recklessness, such as the balanc-
ing of potential harm and gain.
Despite these abstract analytical difficulties, the new test from Bullock is
what it is.  Perhaps the best solution is to interpret Bullock as modifying the
requirements of willful blindness from focusing on a fact to a risk.  Hence, as
adapted by Bullock, willful blindness requires a debtor to (a) subjectively be-
lieve that there was a high probability that a substantial and unjustifiable risk
existed, and (b) take deliberate actions to avoid learning of that risk.  These
240MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02 cmt. 3 (Am. Law Inst. 1985).
241Global-Tech Appliances, Inc., 121 S. Ct. at 2069. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(7) (1962).
242David Luban, Contrived Ignorance, 87 GEO. L.J. 957, 962 (1999).
243Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1759.
244It seems to create some type of quasi-conditional probability.
245The “high probability” of the existence of a fact comes from Section 2.02(7) of the Model Penal
Code and the Global-Tech Appliances case.
246The “probability less than substantial certainty” derives from Comment 3 to Section 2.02 of the
Model Penal Code.
247WAYNE R. LEFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 5.4(f) at 285 (5th ed. 2010).
248Jonathan L. Marcus, Model Penal Code Section 2.02(7) and Willful Blindness, 102 YALE L. J. 2231,
2239-2240 (1993).
249Id. (“For example, consider the actor who believes the gun she points at her friend is empty (because
her parents told her that the gun was rarely loaded) and is shocked when the gun fires as she pulls the
trigger.  This actor could not be convicted of knowingly shooting her friend, because she was not aware of
a high probability that the gun was loaded and she actually believed the gun to be empty.  On the other
hand, she could be convicted for recklessness because she consciously disregarded a substantial and unjusti-
fiable risk that the gun was loaded.”).
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adapted willful blindness requirements may be substituted for a debtor’s sub-
jective awareness and disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk.
As to the first requirement of willful blindness, criminal courts have held
that a high probability may be proven by evidence demonstrating either that
the defendant suspected the risk, that the circumstances indicate that he was
aware of the risk, or spoke to another about the likelihood of the risk.250
Criminal courts have determined that the second requirement of willful
blindness may be satisfied by evidence of “overt physical acts” or “purely
psychological avoidance.”251  Overt physical acts would include efforts by a
debtor to “insulate himself from the [substantial and unjustifiable risk] so
that he could deny knowledge of it”252 and “purposely contriv[ing] to avoid
learning all of the facts in order to have a defense in the event of a subsequent
prosecution.”253  Thus, an overt physical act requires “evidence the [debtor]
physically acted to avoid knowledge.”254  Psychological avoidance involves
the “cutting off of [the debtor’s] normal curiosity by an effort of will”255 such
as “consciously refus[ing] to take basic investigatory steps.”256
D. ADDITIONAL IMPLICATIONS THAT MAY ARISE FROM BULLOCK
Two unrelated additional implications from Bullock may arise.  First, in
jurisdictions that historically did not require a specific mental state for a de-
falcation, the heightened mental standard from Bullock may make it difficult
for creditor/plaintiffs to prevail on summary judgment in adversary proceed-
ings alleging nondischargeability due to defalcation.257
Second, Bullock’s new standard also may have created a heightened plead-
ing requirement.  In addition to the general requirement that a plaintiff must
plead sufficient facts,258 allegations of fraud or mistake require the plaintiff to
250United States v. Yi, 704 F.3d 800, 805 (9th Cir. 2013); U.S. S.E.C. v. Big Apple Consulting USA,
Inc., No. 6:09-cv-1963-Orl-28GJK, 2012 WL 3264512, p. 4. (M.D. Fla. Aug. 9, 2012).
251Yvonne Lee, Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.: Discovering Willfully Blind Territory in
Induced Patent Infringement, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 325, 339, (2012).
252United States v. Diaz, 864 F.2d 544, 551 (7th Cir. 1988).
253United States v. Brandon, 17 F.3d 409, 452 (1st Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Rivera, 944
F.2d 1563, 1571 (11th Cir. 1991)).
254United States v. Carrillo, 435 F.3d 767, 780 (7th Cir. 2006).
255Id.
256United States v. St. Michael’s Credit Union, 880 F.2d 579, 585 (1st Cir. 1989).
257First American Title Insurance Company v. Moses (In re Moses), No. 10-51769-ess, 2013 WL
3804721 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. July 19, 2013) (holding there was a dispute of material fact on whether the
debtor carried out his professional activities with the required culpable state of mind); Neff v. Akbari-
Shahmirzadi, (In re Akbari-Shahmirzadi), No. 7-11-15351, 2013 WL 3300056 (Bankr. D. New Mexico July
1, 2013) (holding there were material disputed facts about defendant’s state of mind).
258FED. R. BANKR. P. 7008 (incorporating Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Bell Atlan-
tic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (stating the plaintiff must provide “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face”); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664 (2009) (stating that “[a]
court considering a motion to dismiss may begin by identifying allegations that, because they are mere
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“state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”259
In jurisdictions that treat breach of a fiduciary duty by self-dealing as being in
the nature of fraud,260 such a breach may trigger the heightened pleading
requirement.  Even if Bullock’s new standard is not deemed to trigger the
particularity requirement for fraud, plaintiffs should be careful in wording
defalcation averments.261  For example, alleging that a fiduciary debtor “knew
or should have known” or “recognized or should have recognized” creates a
risk that the claim may be dismissed.262  As explained earlier, the new test
under Bullock adopts subjective and objective standards that apply to specific
elements of defalcation.  Making an objective “should have known” allegation
for a subjective “knew or must have known” element could result in a dismis-
sal of the claim.
E. THE NEW ANALYTICAL STRUCTURE OF DETERMINING
DEFALCATION WHILE ACTING IN A FIDUCIARY CAPACITY
The new analytical approach to determining whether a debt is for defal-
cation while acting in a fiduciary capacity under § 523(a)(4) has several steps.
The pitfalls identified in this Article can be avoided by methodically analyz-
ing each step separately and making reasonable adaptations where criminal
law and fiduciary law differ.  Under Bullock, defalcation requires:
(1) the debtor be acting in a certain type263 of “fiduciary
capacity” under § 523(a)(4).
(2) According to the Supreme Court’s 1934 decision in Da-
vis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., the debtor must be acting
in the fiduciary capacity “before the wrong and without
reference thereto.”264  The “wrong” is the violation of
the fiduciary duty.
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.  While legal conclusions can provide the com-
plaint’s framework, they must be supported by factual allegations”).
259FED. R. BANKR. P. 7009 (incorporating Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
260Maksym v. Loesch, 937 F.2d 1237, 1241 (7th Cir. 1991) (“self-dealing in the course of a fiduciary
relationship is . . . a form of fraud”).
261Unlike many of the other exceptions to discharge in § 523(a), debts that would otherwise be non-
dischargeable under § 523(a)(4) are automatically discharged unless a creditor specifically requests the
court determine the dischargeability of the debt.  11 U.S.C. § 523(c).   The determination is made in an
adversary proceeding and Bankruptcy Rule 4007(c) requires a complaint be filed no later than sixty days
after the first date set for the meeting of creditors. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(c), 4007(e) and 7001(6).
262Vasudevan Software Inc. v. Tibco Software, Inc., No. C 11-06638 RS, 2012 WL 1831543 (N.D.
Cal. May 18, 2012).
263See Part II, Section B.
264Davis, 293 U.S. at 331, (quoting Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 17, 30 Stat. 544, 550, formerly codified
at 11 U.S.C. § 35 (repealed 1978)) (interpreting a predecessor to the current Bankruptcy Code that
stated: “A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all his provable debts, except such as . . .
were created by his fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, or defalcation while acting as an officer or in
any fiduciary capacity).”
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(3) Using an objective standard, there must be a “substantial
and unjustified” risk that a fiduciary duty would be vio-
lated.  Substantiality involves both the probability and
significance of the risk.  Justifiability looks at the propri-
ety of the risk.  This evaluation has subjective aspects
because it also considers the nature of the debtor’s con-
duct, the purpose of the debtor’s conduct, and the cir-
cumstances known to the debtor.
(4) Using a subjective standard, the debtor must have con-
sciously disregarded the risk.  Conscious disregard re-
quires proof that the debtor had an actual awareness of
the risk or circumstantial evidence inferring the debtor
must have been aware of the risk.  Disregard can be eval-
uated by considering whether the debtor’s conduct was
a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a
reasonable fiduciary in the debtor’s situation would have
observed.  A gross deviation involves conduct that is be-
yond a simple breach of a trustee’s duty of prudent ad-
ministration and a reasonable exercise of a trustee’s
discretionary powers.
(5) Finally, if there is no conscious disregard, the debtor
must have been willfully blind to the substantial and un-
justifiable risk.  This requires a debtor to (a) subjectively
believe that there was a high probability that a substan-
tial and unjustifiable risk existed, and (b) take deliberate
actions to avoid learning of that risk.
IV. CONCLUSION
Bullock resolved the circuit split and set forth the minimum culpability
required by a fiduciary debtor to make a debt nondischargeable.  The height-
ened “recklessly” standard makes it likely that courts will find more and more
debts arising from a debtor’s breach of fiduciary duty to be dischargeable, and
furthers the bankruptcy policy of providing debtors with a fresh start.  But
using the Model Penal Code’s “recklessly” definition is awkward in a civil
fiduciary context.  Courts must take care to ensure that they break down the
elements of Bullock’s “recklessly” standard into the corresponding objective
and subjective parts.  They should also exercise caution in applying the “will-
ful blindness” standard as a substitute for “conscious disregard.”  If the “will-
ful blindness” standard is used, courts should modify it to focus on risk.
Courts may avoid the pitfalls of the Bullock “recklessly” standard by follow-
ing the analytical framework suggested in this Article.  Without using such a
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methodical approach, courts will risk inconsistent and unpredictable applica-
tion of the defalcation exception to discharge.
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